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ABSTRACT
The relationships between citizens and their states are undergoing
signiﬁcant stresses across advanced liberal democracies. In Britain,
this disconnect is particularly evident amongst young citizens.
This article considers whether different electoral engineering
methods – designed either to cajole or compel youth to vote –
might arrest the decline in their political engagement. Data
collected in 2011 from a national survey of 1025 British 18-year-
olds and from focus groups involving 86 young people reveal that
many young people claim that they would be more likely to vote
in future elections if such electoral reforms were implemented.
However, it is questionable whether or not such increased
electoral participation would mean that they would feel truly
connected to the democratic process. In particular, forcing young
people to vote through the introduction of compulsory voting
may actually serve to reinforce deepening resentments, rather
than engage them in a positive manner.
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Introduction
In recent years, young people’s futures have become increasingly susceptible to, and
shaped by, the spread of neoliberalism and it’s actualisation in the economic and social
policies pursued by governments across many advanced liberal democracies (Furlong
and Cartmel 2012). In particular, austerity programmes introduced as a response to the
developing global economic crisis since 2008 have resulted in an intensiﬁcation of the
risks and uncertainties faced by the current youth generation (Sloam 2014). At the same
time – and in part as a consequence of these developments – there has occurred a dee-
pening disconnect between young citizens and formal politics in many advanced demo-
cratic states. While we have seen a rise in the level of their involvement in social activism
(Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004), this has contrasted with a steady decline in youth elec-
toral participation (Wattenberg 2008). In Britain, this divide between young people and
mainstream democratic politics is particularly visible, and their lack of presence at elec-
tions often leads commentators and academics to disregard young people as apathetic
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Matt Henn matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk
JOURNAL OF YOUTH STUDIES, 2016
VOL. 19, NO. 9, 1259–1280
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2016.1154935
and uninterested in democratic politics – or even as anti-political (see, for instance: Stoker
2006; Hay 2007; Farthing 2010; Phelps 2012).
This paper seeks to explore the factors underlying the ongoing rift between young citi-
zens and the British state, and to investigate whether and how this generation might be
re-connected to the democratic process. It begins by examining the debate concerning
young people’s disengagement from formal democratic politics; in particular, it considers
whether or not this is symptomatic of entrenched apathy, or instead whether it is indica-
tive of a youth generation that is re-directing its attention towards alternative forms of pol-
itical practice. Secondly, the paper examines the consequences of young people’s electoral
abstention if left un-checked, especially in terms of its impact on the deepening of existing
generational social and economic inequalities. The paper then considers the prospects
open for governments to intervene in order to stimulate meaningful youth electoral par-
ticipation, which fosters enhanced commitment to the democratic process. This assesses
young people’s views on a range of electoral administrative reforms, including extending
the voting period and increasing the range of voting methods beyond physical attend-
ance at the ballot booth. It has been contended that compulsory voting offers a practical
way forward to reduce electoral inequalities, by mobilising increased turnout of perennial
abstainers such as the young, the least politically interested and the socio-economically
disadvantaged (Lijphart 1997; Singh 2014). The paper then analyses young people’s
views on proposals intended to compel them to vote.
Explaining youth (dis)engagement – apathy or alternative politics?
That the electoral turnout rate of young citizens in Britain is lower than for their older con-
temporaries is not in question. Estimates vary on the turnout rate for 18 to 24-year-olds at
the 2015 General Election, ranging from 58% (Sky News 2015) to 43% (Ipsos MORI 2015).
Nonetheless, youth electoral participation remained well below rates recorded during the
1980s and 1990s (Henn and Foard 2014); it was also signiﬁcantly less than for their older
contemporaries, with for instance 76% of those aged 65 and over voting at the 2015
contest – a generational electoral gap of 33% (Ipsos MORI 2015). However, it is not only
their rate of electoral participation that distinguishes young people from other citizens.
There is a signiﬁcant body of evidence suggesting that young people in the UK and in
other advanced liberal democracies are withdrawing from other formal and institutiona-
lised methods of political participation, deﬁned by Hooghe and Marien as referring to
‘all participation acts that are, directly, or indirectly, linked to the functioning of political
institutions’ (2014, 538). But what is behind this apparent young citizen–state disconnect?
Phelps (2012) has articulated two competing schools of thought which seek to explain
young people’s disengagement from formal institutionalised politics, and their turn
toward alternative political repertoires. The ﬁrst of these is a traditional political science
understanding, which contends that the generational participatory divide is a conse-
quence of life-cycle factors, in which young citizens are confronted with key start-up pro-
blems that inhibit their engagement with formal democratic politics (Nie, Verba, and Kim
1974; Parry, Moyser, and Day 1992). Thus, this approach suggests that various life-style and
contextual factors including increasing levels of geographic mobility and a corresponding
lack of connection and engagement within neighbourhoods, as well as extended and
complex transitions into adulthood, combine to problematise their life-courses, leaving
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relatively little time and space to prioritise conventional politics including voting (Phelps
2012). However, as they enter later phases of adulthood, it is claimed that they acquire
the resources and space to engage with the formal political process, including voting in
elections (Norris 2003).
In contrast, an alternative position contends that this predominant political science
thesis is too limiting in its methodology, relying on conventional (typically quantitative)
indicators in order to deﬁne engagement with politics and political participation, such
as electoral activity and support for, and membership of, mainstream political parties
(Henn, Weinstein, and Wring 2002; Marsh, O’Toole, and Jones 2007). This ‘anti-apathy’
approach (Phelps 2012) claims that such traditional understandings fail to fully appreciate
the diverse range of non-institutionalised political actions that young citizens engage in.
These include demonstrations (Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004), political consumerism
(Micheletti and Stolle 2008) and Internet activism (Oser, Hooghe, and Marien 2013).
Unlike the life-cycle approach which contends that low rates of participation in formal poli-
tics will correct over time and follow a positive and upward trajectory, the anti-apathy
approach considers that young people are actively by-passing such conventional modes
and channels of participation. Instead, they are more inclined to embrace alternative
forms of non-institutionalised and extra-parliamentary modes of political action which
more closely accord with their individuated life-styles and aspirations and which are
more self-actualising; these are considered to be less hierarchical, more expressive,
more participative, more ﬂexible, more meaningful and ultimately more effective
(Giddens 1991; Beck 1992; Henn, Weinstein, and Wring 2002; Farthing 2010; Furlong
and Cartmel 2012; Tormey 2015). Furthermore, the ‘anti-apathy’ approach challenges
the notion that young citizens are inherently uninterested in politics. Instead, it is
claimed that there is signiﬁcant evidence to indicate that whilst British youth hold a
deep aversion to the forms of politics as practised by professional politicians at Westmin-
ster, they are interested in ‘politics’ in its broadest sense (Holmes and Manning 2013; Henn
and Foard 2014).
Generational electoral inequality and the deepening of socio-economic
inequalities
According to Dalton (2008), the very fact that young citizens are engaging in alternative
styles of politics and civic action suggests that the continued decline witnessed in their
rates of participation in formal institutionalised politics such as voting does not by itself
present a problem for contemporary advanced liberal democracies. However, this is a con-
tested view. Firstly, it is arguable that active participation of young people in political and
social life is very important for this generation and for society more broadly, as effective
governance requires a strong political culture in which people feel connected with, and
supportive of, the state (Birch, Gottfried, and Lodge 2013). As Whiteley contends, ‘[i]f
few people participate in elections, then the state will lose its legitimacy and it will not
be able to persuade its citizens to cooperate in the tasks of governing’ (2012, 9).
A further challenge to Dalton’s position is offered by Wattenberg (2008) who claims that
any generational disparity in electoral participation rates tends to result in the policy con-
cerns of young people being given relatively little priority by the political classes. Thus,
when elected to ofﬁce, politicians in government will tend to pursue policies that
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favour older and other more voting-inclined groups at the expense of younger and more
non-voting-inclined groups (Berry 2012). Evidence suggests that this process has recently
been present in Britain, and has furthered the disconnect between young citizens and the
state. For instance, Furlong and Cartmel (2012) claim that at the 2010 UK General Election,
the debate concerning university tuition fees tended to centre on the implications for
older tax-paying parents and guardians rather than viewing the issue from the position
of the (prospective) students themselves. The developing global economic crisis and
associated Government austerity policies have also placed a disproportionate burden
on the young (Sloam 2014). Reﬂecting this, a recent Institute for Public Policy Research
report has highlighted the differential impact of the UK Government’s 2010 Comprehen-
sive Spending Review on different social groups. It concluded that the 16–24-year-old
group has suffered more than any other group from the cuts (Birch, Gottfried, and
Lodge 2013). This has serious implications for contributing to the deepening of existing
generational social and economic inequalities.
These recent and perceived failings of professional politicians to champion the policy
concerns of today’s young people have left this generation feeling relatively ignored
and marginalised (Mycock and Tonge 2012). This state of affairs helps to account for
young people’s continued withdrawal from the electoral process.
UK Government responses to the citizen–state divide
In the formal political realm, national politicians have observed this persisting youth elec-
toral abstention with increasing concern. For instance, a recent UK House of Commons
report has concluded that, ‘[D]emocracy is working less well than it used to and we
need to move swiftly to pre-empt a crisis. The scale of the response must be equal to
the task’ (House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 2014, 6).
This is despite the endeavours of recent governments who have sought to stem the
tide of voter abstention and diminishing political engagement by the introduction of
initiatives designed to increase political literacy and to make the process of voting more
accessible.
Such programmes and schemes are broadly ‘procedural–technical’ in nature, rather
than involving the introduction of far-reaching political reforms designed to create
routes for young people to more readily access the centres of power as advocated by
Stoker (2006) and Henn and Foard (2012a). Thus, the introduction of statutory citizenship
classes in schools in England in 2002 was in large part prompted by the concerns of the
national Government at that time that young people lacked any inclination to participate
in the political process – as well as the requisite political literacy skills to do so effectively
(Tonge, Mycock, and Jeffery 2012). In addition, there have been a number of initiatives
considered and others implemented which have been designed to modernise electoral
administration. The Representation of the People Act 2000 approved the use of experiments
in local elections to encourage people to register to vote, to remove perceived disincen-
tives to vote and to make voting easier. As a consequence, pilot schemes of innovative
electoral procedures were conducted across many local authorities between 2000 and
2007. These included remote electronic voting (for instance, by Internet and text messa-
ging), voting during different hours, on different days or over a number of days, and all-
postal voting. Evidence suggests that the impact and veracity of these initiatives have
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been mixed (Boon, Curtice, and Martin 2007), although there have recently been calls by
the UK House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (2014) and the
Electoral Commission (Mason 2014) to advance investigations into such electoral modern-
isation methods. Wattenberg contends that while not a cure-all, such reforms might con-
tribute to lessening ongoing generational disparities in electoral participation (2008).
In this paper, data will be analysed to examine the extent to which governmental inter-
ventions in the form of such administrative electoral reforms might persuade young
people to engage more fully in the electoral process, and by doing so, serve to reduce
the young citizen–state disconnect.
Might compulsory voting resolve the young citizen–state disconnect?
One method recently considered by which government might intervene to reduce young
people’s disengagement from electoral politics is to introduce a system of compulsory
voting for ﬁrst-time voters. In this scenario, young people who have only recently
reached the minimum voting age and who have not formerly had the opportunity to
vote would be obliged to turn out on their ﬁrst occasion to do so – regardless of the elec-
toral level (national, local, European or other). As a one-off compulsory system, it is con-
sidered that this would ‘kick-start a life-long habit of voting’ (Birch, Gottfried, and Lodge
2013, 21). However, there are signiﬁcant democratic values and civil rights dimensions
to this issue, and it has been the subject of a recent ongoing and unresolved debate
(see for instance Saunders 2010; Fischer 2011).
A key argument in support of compulsory voting for young people is that it will signiﬁ-
cantly increase this generation’s attendance at the ballot booths by up to 30% (Hill 2011). Fur-
thermore, if young people are compelled to vote, then this might facilitate access to their
dormant democratic spirit, and stimulate a habit for positive democratic engagement in
the future (Franklin 2004). Secondly, evidence suggests that compulsory voting may
reduce generational disparities in electoral participation rates (Singh 2014); in particular, it
helps to ensure that socio-economically disadvantaged groups are neither under-rep-
resented at the ballot booth nor under-estimated in the minds of politicians and policy-
makers (Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998). It is therefore reasoned that, in delivering higher
youth turnout rates, compulsory voting might oblige professional politicians to treat
young people and their policy concerns on a par with those of their older contemporaries
(Lijphart 1997; Birch, Gottfried, and Lodge 2013). In essence, by helping to eliminate the gen-
erational electoral divide, it is argued that this would have the effect of reducing generational
social and economic policy inequalities. This might contribute to the creation of a virtuous
circle, in that young people begin to recognise the latent power of their vote and of their
inﬂuence over the political class – and this might help to shape an enhanced positive predis-
position to electoral participation. However, this is a contested position. According to Lever:
Compulsory voting is clearly no guarantee of egalitarian social policies, and the Australian case
– where compulsory voting is extremely popular and is long established – shows that increas-
ing turnout does not force parties to compete for the votes of the poor, the weak and the mar-
ginalised. (2008, 63)
A major drawback of such a compulsory voting scheme for young people is that it singles
them out as ‘different’ from the rest of the adult population, helping to reinforce the
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stereotype of this current youth generation as distinctly apathetic. The implication being
that it is the behaviour of young people that needs changing, rather than a reform of the
political process and of democratic institutions including political parties to make the latter
more accessible and meaningful for today’s youth generation.
Furthermore, it might be argued that compelling any young person to vote who has
only limited interest in mainstream electoral politics or who feels no afﬁnity with the
parties on offer has serious negative implications for the health of our democratic
system; by forcing them to vote, they may develop an attitude of entrenched disdain
for the parties, or indeed become particularly susceptible to parties with antidemocratic
tendencies – especially those of the far-right (Jensen and Spoon 2011). However, offer-
ing the option to vote for ‘None of the above’ on the ballot paper may help mitigate
against this latter point (House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Commit-
tee 2014).
Despite such conjecture, there remain unanswered the questions, (i) would compulsory
voting resolve the young citizen–state disconnect, and (ii) would it result in enhanced
high-quality political engagement? This conundrum is captured in the recent deliberations
of the UK Electoral Commission (2006, 6), which concluded that:
It is clear from the available evidence that compulsory voting both increases aggregate
turnout and reduces the variation in turnout rates among different groups. Less clear is the
effect compulsory voting has on political engagement more generally.
Research design
In this paper, we investigate why it is that so many eligible young people abstain from
voting in elections. Is this a consequence of various life-cycle start-up factors which
inhibit their participation and which induce political apathy, but which might be over-
come with time as they enter a later life phase? Or is it instead, because they feel alienated
from the political process, which carries the possibility that their disconnection from elec-
toral politics might endure into advanced life stages? To address these matters, we con-
sider the following issues from the perspectives of British youth, based on analyses of a
qualitative data set:
. levels of interest in, and understanding of, politics and elections;
. attitudes towards the political process and democratic institutions in Britain;
. degree of faith in political parties and politicians.
We then use a related quantitative data set to consider what scope there might be for gov-
ernment to re-engage young citizens with the formal democratic process in Britain, and to
encourage their turnout at elections. We do this by assessing their responses to a range of
electoral administration measures intended to persuade them to vote. In particular, we
aim to examine how young people’s responses to such proposals are linked with, and
shaped by, their past and likely future voting intentions. Firstly, we consider a range of
six measures designed to make voting more accessible to young people. These include
whether they would be more likely or less likely to vote in the future if they were able
to vote:
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(1) in a public place such as a supermarket;
(2) over more than one day (including weekends);
(3) by post;
(4) by phone (including by text message or smart phone App);
(5) via the Internet or digital television;
(6) or if polling stations were open for 24 hours.
In formal terms, our hypotheses are:
H1: The introduction of new electoral methods designed to make voting more accessible will
be received more positively by young people who voted at the previous General Election than
by their contemporaries who did not vote;
H2: The introduction of new electoral methods designed to make voting more accessible will
be received more positively by young people who intend to vote in a future General Election
than by their contemporaries who expect to abstain from voting.
It has been contended that young people’s lives, perspectives and behaviour are increas-
ingly complex and individualised (Giddens 1991). Research suggests that they are none-
theless also susceptible to, and their perspectives and behaviour shaped by, a complex
array of factors. In particular, there is a signiﬁcant body of research indicating that key
social predictors have an enduring and critical bearing on political participation and
engagement in Britain, and across the age ranges. Thus, age-completed education (White-
ley 2012) and educational qualiﬁcations (Tenn 2007), gender (Furlong and Cartmel 2012),
social class (Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley 2004; Holmes and Manning 2013) and ethnicity
(Heath et al. 2011) are all considered to impact on voting. However, there is relatively
little large-scale empirical research focusing on the diversity of young people’s political
perspectives and behaviour (for exceptions, see Tonge, Mycock, and Jeffery 2012; Henn
and Foard 2014). Furthermore, there is a noticeable absence of research into the effect
of these socio-demographic variables on young people’s attitudes to such government-
initiated electoral reforms as outlined above. In this paper we intend to explore these
relationships which, in formal terms, are expressed in the hypothesis below:
H3: Young people’s views concerning the introduction of new electoral methods designed to
persuade people to vote will vary according to their socio-demographic backgrounds.
We also consider young people’s reaction to a proposal for the introduction of mandatory
voting intended to compel them to participate in the electoral process. Our hypotheses
are:
H4: The introduction of compulsory voting will be received more positively by young people
who voted at the previous General Election than by their contemporaries who did not vote;
H5: The introduction of compulsory voting will be received more positively by young people
who intend to vote in a future General Election than by their contemporaries who expect to
abstain from voting;
H6: Young people’s views concerning the introduction of compulsory voting will vary accord-
ing to their socio-demographic backgrounds.
In order to examine these questions and hypotheses, we used qualitative and quantitative
data from a study conducted by one of the authors in 2011 (Henn and Foard 2012b). Two
unique data sets were created, the ﬁrst of these was derived from a national,
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representative online survey of 1025 young people aged 18 at the time of the 2010 UK
General Election. The survey was conducted during April and May 2011, one year after
the election; this was important because we wanted to assess the views and reactions
of this particular age group after they had been granted their ﬁrst opportunity as newly
enfranchised citizens to gain experience of life under a new government – regardless of
whether or not they had opted to vote in the election.
We also convened 14 online focus groups with a total of 86 participants in November
2011, with participants deliberately selected as young people who had not voted at the
2010 General Election. The intention was to explore the ways in which non-voters, so
often characterised as politically apathetic, conceptualise politics. The focus groups pro-
vided the opportunity to examine the ways in which discourses of politics are constructed
when young people express and shape their views among peers. The focus groups were
subdivided by ‘type’ and separate groups were held for young white people and those
from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups, and likewise, separate male and female
groups, and also groups comprising either those who had progressed to higher education
or those who had opted not to do so. Distinct focus groups were also held with young
people from predominantly professional and middle class (ABC1) households, and those
from more broadly working class (C2DE) households. It is important to note that in the
results section that follows, focus group quotes used are from the original text responses
typed by participants during the online focus groups, and have not been altered to
improve spelling or grammar. The exception to this is where we use [ ] as insertions
which are designed to help clarify the context in which the response was given. Addition-
ally (and unless otherwise indicated), when reviewing verbatim observations from the
focus groups, only typical quotes are used to provide a broadly valid illustrative overview
of the opinions of the young people participating.
Results
The data from the online survey and online focus groups present important insights into
why young people tend to avoid formal democratic politics and why so many continue to
abstain from voting in elections. Equally, the data reveal possibilities and options for gov-
ernment to facilitate the process of re-connecting today’s youth generation with the
formal democratic politics and institutions.
Youth engagement with ‘politics’
In the focus groups, participants (all of whom had opted not to vote at the previous year’s
general election) were asked, ‘If I say politics, what do you say?’. Responses indicate that
they tend to deﬁne ‘politics’ in its most formal sense – as the politics of Westminster,
centred on elections and the main political parties – and they ﬁnd this form of politics con-
siderably remote, deeply unappealing and resting on deception. A small selection of
typical responses offered by participants includes:
. i feel its boring as it doesnt feel like it relates to me in any way shape or form
. a way of makeing you feel you have a say when you don’t
. I always try and avoid politics because they all get me angry
1266 M. HENN AND B. OLDFIELD
. they break promises, they want our votes then cast us off like we didnt care in the ﬁrst
place. i think if i ever voted i would feel used for the vote
Despite this characterisation of politics, the data reveal that young people do study the world
around them – and they often feel strongly about contemporary issues, even if they do not
necessarily consider those issues to be overtly ‘political’ in nature. This ﬁts with the anti-
apathy approach outlined by Phelps (2012) suggesting that young people are interested in
matters that are of civic and political consequence. Focus group participants were asked,
‘If you could change one thing about the world, what would it be, and why?’. This question
was designed to enable us to gain a sense of which issues and matters were of primary
concern to them, as well as their reasons for emphasising such concerns. Figure 1 categorises
these open responses.1 As expected, the reactions to the question were varied, although par-
ticipants demonstrated a particularly solidaristic outlook and a broad commitment to social
justice. Thus, a signiﬁcant number of respondents prioritised the tackling of domestic and
global inequalities and support for a generalised redistribution of wealth. They also advo-
cated the introduction of measures designed to reduce poverty (‘lessen the gap between
the richest and poorest people’; ‘I would like equality throughout the world and would like
to end poverty’). Furthermore, the emphasis on collective social justice was also revealed
through the desire to eliminate all forms of prejudice and discrimination: stop descrimination
and rascism as everyone is the same; put a stop to bullying and unfair treatment.
The focus groups also revealed clear signs of an underlying youth anxiety about their
immediate educational and employment prospects:
. Higher education and in particular, employment prospects at the end of it
. the cost of education , i think education should be free for everyone no matter were you
frm
. employmnt for the youths really s an issue for me
Prospects for achieving political inﬂuence
Although they appear to be interested in politics, young people seem to lack conﬁdence in
the political system, or what others have referred to as ‘external efﬁcacy’ (Westholme and
Niemi 1986). Data from the focus groups reveal that they feel unable to translate this inter-
est into participation in the formal political system – which they consider to be unrespon-
sive to the actions of individual and collective groups of citizens. They also feel that there
are relatively few meaningful opportunities available for themselves or other young
people to access the centres and levers of political power. The data indicate that young
people feel a sense of fatalism and inevitability with respect to this lack of perceived exter-
nal efﬁcacy, especially in relation to individual political action and participation:
. the indivdual cant change it
. plenty of people have voiced thier opinion about all the different cuts some through
protests… it still hasnt changed circumstances so little old me would be useless
. [… ] one cannot do it themselves, we need thousands upon thousands to make the
slightest difference
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Of course, we recognise that since the focus group participants were intentionally selected
as non-voters, we might expect them to hold such pessimistic views on this matter;
however, given that a considerable majority of young people abstained at the 2010
General Election, these results provide important insights into why they feel demotivated
to vote. Interestingly, there was a mixed response when they were asked to comment on
collective political action, including protests. On the one hand, a considerable minority of
young people highlighted the potential efﬁcacy of such methods for advancing causes
and facilitating positive political change – especially in contrast to the perceived value
of individual political action:
Figure 1. If you could change one thing about the world, what would it be, and why?
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. i think there is strength in numbers not individuals acting alone
. i believe if large enough numbers it could [be effective]
. if a big enough group of people stand up they might listen!
However, the predominant view emerging from the focus groups was that even such col-
lective actions had only limited potential for effecting political change. Their response to
events such as the student demonstrations in 2011 and the Occupy movement was rela-
tively resigned and stoical:
. protest all you want it wont change anything
. it doesnt work, 100′s of protests can happen but nt one will work it takes more then
people sitting protesting for anything to b done
. take a look at the education protests [… ] we tried SO HARD [… ] we lost
In many respects, these pessimistic views seem to be underpinned by a strong sense
across the focus groups that the political class is an unresponsive elite with little regard
for the views of young people, and not easily inﬂuenced by the actions of, and challenges
posed by, citizens – especially young citizens:
. i dont feel we have a chance of making a difference to things we care about as the desi-
sions have already been made for us
. it feels like the public have no say. the governemt already have everything planned out
. the only way the government will actually take notice of us will be if we acted in the
same way the people in the arab uprisings did but what could be a good enough
reason to act like that ?
Conﬁdence in the democratic process and the political class
Whilst this youth group appears to be relatively fatalistic with respect to the scope and pro-
spects for achieving political inﬂuence and effecting meaningful political change, they are
broadly supportive of democratic ideals and processes. For instance, results from the
online survey suggest a majority of young people in Britain are committed to the principle
of voting (57%), with a sizeable group expressing support for competitive elections (48%).
However, the current youth generation is deeply averse to professional politicians and
those who have been elevated to positions of formal political power through these elec-
tions. The survey indicates that 81% of young people disapprove of the political class. The
data from the focus groups reveal the source and extent of this ambivalence – and in some
cases hostility – towards the political class. On the one hand, professional politicians are
seen as remote and incapable of governing in an empathetic manner or with due
regard for the interests and aspirations of young citizens:
. they seem to live in a totally different world to everyone else
. they dont think like the majority of the ‘common person’
. i dont think they can really relate to students or youths… clearly theres a problem
when students are protesting and youths are rioting
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On the other hand, this political class is considered to be cynical and self-serving, and
lacking any serious commitment towards championing the concerns of young people.
These views are typiﬁed by the following statements:
. i think the politicians have lost the trust of our generation
. … the goverment just dose what it wants to do and dosent listen to what the public
want they say they will make changes so you will vote for them and then dont back
up there promises
. … once a aprty is voted into power their views often change, as seen this year when
two largely apposing parties joined in a coalition
Young people’s reactions to hypothetical electoral administrative reforms
Rather than entrenched political apathy, the analyses presented above reveal that young
people’s persisting disengagement from formal democratic politics is symptomatic of their
alienation from this politics and of their scepticism of the motives and behaviours of the
political classes. Although they are concerned observers of local, national and global
affairs, they ﬁnd formal politics remote and unappealing. Given this context, how might
government intervene to reduce the ongoing young citizen–state disconnect? In the
online survey, young people were asked to indicate their responses to different proposed
measures that government might introduce for the purposes of stimulating increased
electoral turnout. These included hypothetical proposals to encourage increased electoral
turnout as well as a system to make voting compulsory.
Tables 1–3 summarise young people’s reactions to several different hypothetical elec-
toral reforms designed to make voluntary voting more accessible to citizens. The ﬁndings
suggest that voting via the Internet or digital TV would be particularly effective in terms of
encouraging them to vote at the next general election (57%). For the remaining ﬁve pro-
posals considered, the largest groups reported that such changes would make no differ-
ence to their likelihood to vote in the future.
The chi-square analyses (X2) in Table 1 indicate that whether or not survey respondents
voted at the previous 2010 General Election had no statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
their reactions to these six electoral reform scenarios. However, Table 2 reveals consider-
able variation in the views of those intending to vote in the future and those intending to
abstain. This suggests that the main target group of such electoral reforms – those who
report that they are least likely to vote in the future – are signiﬁcantly less positive
about each of these reform ideas than are those who claim that they are already intending
to vote. This is the case for each of the proposals except the item, ‘ … able to vote over
more than one day’, where the variation is considerable but not statistically signiﬁcant.
This is an important ﬁnding, suggesting intending abstainers are least convinced by the
proposals. However, Table 2 also reveals that even in this particular sub-group, there
exists a sizeable minority that might be cajoled into voting in the future should such initiat-
ives be implemented. Thus, if voting were to be available by the Internet or by digital TV,
nearly half of intending abstainers (45%) report that they might be persuaded to vote; fur-
thermore, nearly a third of this sub-group (32%) were open to the idea of voting by phone.
These ﬁndings suggest that introducing increased ﬂexibility into the electoral provisions
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might help to encourage some to reconsider their stated intention to abstain from parti-
cipating in future elections.
There is some evidence that young people’s reactions to the proposed electoral initiat-
ives are linked to their socio-demographic backgrounds. As Table 3 indicates, there are
statistically signiﬁcant ethnicity and gender gaps. Young females (X2 = 10.01, p < .01)
and those from BME backgrounds (X2 = 7.04, p < .05) are more positively predisposed to
postal voting than are other young people. A similar pattern was also revealed for
voting by the Internet or digital television, with signiﬁcantly greater support from
young females (X2 = 12.14, p < .01) and those from BME backgrounds (X2 = 6.80, p < .05)
than from their respective counterparts. Young women are also considerably more per-
suaded by the value of telephone voting than are young males (X2 = 16.82, p < .001).
There are no signiﬁcant variations between different socio-demographic groups for the
remaining three items. Furthermore, the data also suggest that neither social class, level
of formal educational qualiﬁcations nor whether or not they have chosen to remain in
full-time education performs a statistically signiﬁcant role in shaping young people’s per-
spectives (p > .05) with regard to any of the electoral initiatives considered.
The results of linear regression analyses indicate that whether or not young people had
voted in the previous 2010 General Election had no signiﬁcant bearing on their attitudes
towards these electoral reforms (p > .05). However, future turnout intention is a statistically
Table 1. Proposals to increase voting by whether voted at the 2010 general election.
Voted at the 2010 General
Election?
Would you be more likely or less likely to vote in the future if: Yes No
… you were able to vote in a public place such as a supermarket?
More likely 29.2% 35.9%
Make no difference 59.6% 51.9%
Less Likely 11.2% 12.2%
χ2 = 4.84, df = 2, p = .089
… you were able to vote over more than one day (including weekends)?
More likely 45.2% 46.4%
Make no difference 51.0% 48.7%
Less likely 3.8% 4.9%
χ2 = .854, df = 2, p = .653
… polling stations were open for 24 hours?
More likely 42.8% 37.5%
Make no difference 56.1% 60.3%
Less likely 1.2% 2.2%
χ2 = 3.53, df = 2, p = .172
… you were able to vote by post?
More likely 33.0% 40.2%
Make no difference 61.5% 53.1%
Less likely 5.5% 6.6%
χ2 = 5.64, df = 2, p = .060
… you were able to vote by phone (including by text message or smart phone app)?
More likely 44.4% 50.4%
Make no difference 48.8% 43.3%
Less likely 6.8% 6.3%
χ2 = 2.80, df = 2, p = .247
… you were able to vote via the internet or digital TV?
More likely 55.0% 61.3%
Make no difference 40.5% 34.9%
Less likely 4.5% 3.7%
χ2 = 3.17, df = 2, p = .205
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signiﬁcant predictor of their reaction to two of the electoral items. Those claiming an exist-
ing intention to vote in a future general election were even more likely to do so if polling
stations were open for 24 hours (Beta =−.097, p = .008) or vote by post (Beta =−.072, p
= .047). All other variables were not signiﬁcant predictors of any of the initiatives (p > .05).
Interestingly, the only evidence of young people’s socio-demographic background display-
ing any impact on their views of these electoral reform ideas was in terms of their gender.
Females were more likely than males to express an interest in voting by post (Beta = .082,
p = .012), or by phone (Beta = .123, p< .001), or by Internet or digital television (Beta = .108,
p = .001). None of the other socio-demographic variables entered into the regression were sig-
niﬁcant predictors (p > .05) of respondents’ reactions to the proposed electoral initiatives.
Young people’s reactions to the prospect of compulsory voting
The young survey participants were also asked how the introduction of a system of com-
pulsory voting might impact on their future voting intentions. Perhaps not surprisingly, the
largest group reported that such a shift in electoral law would increase their likelihood to
vote in any forthcoming contest (47%). Nonetheless, there remained a signiﬁcant minority
Table 2. Proposals to increase voting by likelihood to vote at the next general election.
Likelihood of voting at the next general election
Would you be more likely or less likely to vote in the
future if:
Very
unlikely Unlikely
Neither unlikely
or likely Likely
Very
likely
… you were able to vote in a public place such as a
supermarket?
More likely 21.6% 32.5% 32.6% 39.9% 29.4%
Make no difference 73.0% 53.2% 57.4% 52.0% 56.7%
Less likely 5.4% 14.3% 10.1% 8.1% 14.0%
χ2 = 17.52, df = 8, p = .025
… you were able to vote over more than one day
(including weekends)?
More likely 31.1% 38.5% 39.5% 53.7% 47.4%
Make no difference 63.5% 56.4% 55.8% 43.6% 48.2%
Less likely 5.4% 5.1% 4.7% 2.7% 4.5%
χ2 = 14.81, df = 8, p = .063
… polling stations were open for 24 hours?
More likely 30.1% 32.1% 31.6% 45.3% 46.3%
Make no difference 69.9% 66.7% 64.7% 52.7% 52.5%
Less likely 0 1.3% 3.8% 2.0% 1.2%
χ2 = 22.97, df = 8, p = .003
… you were able to vote by post?
More likely 28.0% 33.8% 29.5% 38.9% 35.4%
Make no difference 69.3% 61.3% 59.1% 51.7% 59.7%
Less likely 2.7% 5.0% 11.4% 9.4% 4.9%
χ2 = 16.62, df = 8, p = .034
… you were able to vote by phone (including by text
message or smart phone app)?
More likely 31.6% 43.0% 44.4% 56.1% 45.5%
Make no difference 64.5% 53.2% 46.6% 37.8% 47.2%
Less likely 3.9% 3.8% 9.0% 6.1% 7.3%
χ2 = 18.30, df = 8, p = .019
… you were able to vote via the internet or digital TV?
More likely 45.3% 50.0% 53.4% 65.3% 57.9%
Make no difference 52.0% 43.8% 42.9% 30.6% 37.7%
Less likely 2.7% 6.3% 3.8% 4.1% 4.5%
χ2 = 13.06, df = 8, p = .110
Note: Percentages represent percentage within each column.
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(39%) who stated that such a system would make no difference with respect to their
decision on whether or not to vote.
Of particular note, Table 4 considers variations in young people’s reactions to the idea
of compulsory voting by comparing the views of those who claimed to have voted at the
2010 General Election with those who declared that they had not voted. The chi-square
Table 3. Proposals to increase voting by socio-demographic factors.
Gender Ethnicity
Qualiﬁcations
at level 2
In full-time
education
Main wage
earner is
professional/
managerial
Would you be more likely or
less likely to vote in the future
if: Female Male White BME Yes No Yes No Yes No
… you were able to vote in a
public place such as a
supermarket?
More likely 33.3% 27.9% 30.4% 31.0% 35.1% 28.4% 32.7% 29.3% 30.4% 30.6%
Make no difference 55.8% 60.1% 57.9% 58.4% 53.7% 60.1% 54.7% 59.8% 58.2% 57.8%
Less likely 10.9% 12.0% 11.7% 10.6% 11.3% 11.5% 12.7% 10.8% 11.4% 11.6%
χ2 = 3.23,
p = .199
χ2 = .125,
p = .939
χ2 = 4.61,
p = .100
χ2 = 2.31,
p = .312
χ2 = .011
p = .994
… you were able to vote over
more than one day
(including weekends)?
More likely 48.8% 41.6% 44.9% 47.8% 49.6% 43.6% 42.5% 45.9% 43.8% 46.9%
Make no difference 46.9% 53.8% 50.5% 48.7% 45.7% 52.8% 52.8% 49.9% 51.0% 49.8%
Less likely 4.2% 4.5% 4.6% 3.5% 4.8% 3.6% 4.7% 4.2% 5.2% 3.3%
χ2 = 5.18,
p = .075
χ2 = .545,
p = .761
χ2 = 4.59,
p = .101
χ2 = .971,
p = .615
χ2 = 2.489,
p = .288
… polling stations were open
for 24 hours?
More likely 42.1% 40.0% 40.9% 42.2% 43.5% 41.0% 40.1% 41.5% 39.5% 43.3%
Make no difference 56.2% 58.6% 57.5% 56.0% 55.4% 57.7% 58.2% 57.0% 58.5% 55.8%
Less likely 1.7% 1.4% 1.6% 1.7% 1.2% 1.3% 1.6% 1.5% 2.0% 1.0%
χ2 = .670,
p = .715
χ2 = .085,
p = .958
χ2 = .537,
p = .764
χ2 = .185,
p = .912
χ2 = 2.691,
p = .260
… you were able to vote by
post?
More likely 39.8% 30.2% 34.6% 37.1% 34.3% 35.8% 36.1% 34.3% 34.1% 35.7%
Make no difference 54.4% 63.5% 60.0% 51.7% 59.1% 58.7% 57.7% 60.0% 59.0% 59.3%
Less likely 5.7% 6.3% 5.4% 11.2% 6.6% 5.5% 6.2% 5.6% 6.9% 4.9%
χ2 = 10.01,
p = .006
χ2 = 7.04,
p = .030
χ2 = 551,
p = .759
χ2 = .496,
p = .780
χ2 = 1.721,
p = .423
… you were able to vote by
phone (including text
message or smart phone
app)?
More likely 51.8% 39.1% 44.8% 50.0% 45.8% 45.1% 42.7% 46.3% 44.1% 46.9%
Make no difference 42.9% 52.4% 48.7% 40.5% 46.7% 48.2% 48.2% 47.8% 48.7% 46.7%
Less likely 5.3% 8.5% 6.5% 9.5% 7.5% 6.7% 9.1% 5.8% 7.2% 6.4%
χ2 = 16.82,
p = .000
χ2 = 3.376,
p = .185
χ2 = .328,
p = .849
χ2 = 3.903,
p = .142
χ2 = .846,
p = .655
… you were able to vote via
the internet or digital TV?
More likely 61.4% 51.0% 55.1% 62.1% 57.5% 55.7% 53.0% 57.4% 56.3% 55.8%
Make no difference 35.4% 43.2% 40.8% 30.2% 38.0% 39.9% 41.4% 38.6% 39.4% 39.4%
Less likely 3.2% 5.8% 4.1% 7.8% 4.5% 4.4% 5.6% 4.0% 4.3% 4.8%
χ2 = 12.14,
p = .002
χ2 = 6.80,
p = .033
χ2 = .310,
p = .856
χ2 = 2.299,
p = .317
χ2 = .110,
p = .946
Note: Percentages represent percentage within each column.
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analyses indicate the presence of statistically signiﬁcant differences in the views of these
two groups. In particular, past abstainers were considerably more likely than their voting
counterparts to express an intention to vote in the future should such a system of compul-
sory voting be introduced (56% and 48%, respectively). However, a substantial minority of
the ‘non-voters’ (31%) claimed that such a system would have no impact at all, and that
they would continue to abstain from voting. Furthermore, a signiﬁcant group of ‘non-
voters’ (13%) also reported that they would actually be less inclined to vote should they
be compelled to do so in law. This suggests that such a reform would actually harden
abstainers’ resolve to boycott future elections.
Interestingly, when projecting forward, the chi-square analyses reported in Table 5 reveal
statistically signiﬁcant differences between those who claim an intention to vote in the
future and those who plan to abstain from doing so. For instance, nearly two-thirds of
those who state that they are already ‘very unlikely’ to vote at the next general election
claim that any introduction of compulsory voting would either not change their intentions
to abstain (43%) or would be further even further disinclined to vote (22%). These ﬁndings
suggest that changing electoral law so that young people are compelled to vote might be
counter-productive, and serve to reinforce existing feelings of resentment.
The data in Table 6 also indicate important and statistically signiﬁcant socio-demo-
graphic differences in terms of young people’s reactions to the prospect of making
voting compulsory. Men are more resistant to this idea than are women, while white
youth are less likely to support such plans than are those from BME groups. As might
be expected, education is a key variable; those who had attained higher level qualiﬁcations
and those who had opted to remain in full-time education were considerably more
dubious about compulsory voting than other young people, perhaps reﬂecting a critical
and questioning outlook shaped by exposure to prolonged education. However, there
is no discernible evidence of any social class gap, and those young people from lower
Table 4. Proposals to introduce compulsory voting by whether voted at the 2010 General Election.
Voted at the 2010 General Election?
Would you be more likely or
less likely to vote in the future if: Yes No
Voting was compulsory?
More likely 47.8% 55.5%
Make no difference 45.6% 31.3%
Less likely 6.6% 13.2%
χ2 = 21.58, df = 2, p < .001
Note: Percentages represent percentage within each column.
Table 5. Proposals to introduce compulsory voting by likelihood to vote at the next general election.
Likelihood of voting at the next general election
Would you be more likely or less likely to vote in the
future if:
Very
unlikely Unlikely
Neither unlikely or
likely Likely
Very
likely
Voting was compulsory?
More likely 35.6% 60.3% 42.7% 56.9% 51.2%
Make no difference 42.5% 35.9% 43.5% 34.0% 43.2%
Less likely 21.9% 3.8% 13.7% 9.0% 5.5%
χ2 = 37.52, df = 8, p < .001
Note: Percentages represent percentage within each column.
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social class backgrounds and those from managerial/professional backgrounds are evenly
divided in terms of their views on the merits of compulsory voting.
The results from the linear regression analyses suggest that neither past voting turnout
nor future intention to vote are signiﬁcant predictors of young people’s reception to the
idea of compulsory voting. Young people’s socio-demographic backgrounds were signiﬁ-
cant predictors only in respect of the educational trajectory independent variable (Beta =
−.106, p = .002). Those in full-time education were more likely to vote in the future if voting
was compulsory. None of the other socio-demographic variables (gender, ethnicity,
social class nor educational qualiﬁcations gained) were found to be signiﬁcant predictors
(p > .05).
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this study suggests that contrary to much traditional political
science understanding, the decision of many of the 18-year-old attainers in our study to
abstain from full participation in the democratic process is not borne of apathy or of self-
exclusion. Instead, the data reveal that British young people are interested in political
matters. However, today’s youth are anxious that there exist only relatively few available
opportunities for them to meaningfully participate in formal politics; moreover, they consider
that those who have been elected to public ofﬁce on their behalf have failed to champion
their issue interests. The weight of evidence from our study therefore seems to support
the anti-apathy thesis – that young people’s disengagement from formal politics and demo-
cratic institutions is in part because of their interest in new styles and forms of politics, as well
as political alienation (Henn, Weinstein, and Wring 2002; Marsh, O’Toole, and Jones 2007).
They are of the opinion that the burden of responsibility therefore rests with the political
class to initiate resolution of the ongoing young citizen–state disconnect. However, what are
the prospects of stimulating increased electoral participation and of progressing towards
such ends? Can young people be persuaded to vote by reforming electoral arrangements
so that voting is made more accessible and young person-friendly? The data from our
study indicate that such methods as those listed in Tables 1–3 would have an impact
across the full youth cohort. However, the effects are not uniform, and the data reveal
some import differences across particular sub-groups of young people. Firstly, those who
Table 6. Proposals to introduce compulsory voting by socio-demographic factors.
Gender Ethnicity
Qualiﬁcations
at level 2
In full-time
education
Main wage
earner is
professional/
managerial
Would you be more likely or
less likely to vote in the future
if: Female Male White BME Yes No Yes No Yes No
If voting was compulsory
More likely 52.3% 46.7% 48.3% 60.9% 48.5% 50.7% 43.2% 52.3% 49.6% 49.4%
Make no difference 41.3% 42.4% 43.6% 30.0% 40.4% 42.7% 43.5% 41.2% 42.0% 41.7%
Less likely 6.4% 10.9% 8.2% 9.1% 11.1% 6.5% 13.3% 6.5% 8.3% 8.9%
χ2 = 7.41,
p = .025
χ2 = 7.48,
p = .024
χ2 = 5.99,
p = .050
χ2 = 14.90,
p = .001
χ2 = .103,
p = .950
Note: Percentages represent percentage within each column.
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might be considered as the key focus of the proposed measures – young people who did
not vote at their ﬁrst General Election and also those who intend to abstain in the future
– claim that such reforms would have little impact on their determination to avoid the
polls in future elections. Interestingly, and contrary to Hypothesis 1, there are no discernible
differences here in terms of the attitudes of past voters and non-voters. However, the data
lend support to Hypothesis 2, with those intending to abstain in future elections found to be
signiﬁcantly less persuaded of the merits of these electoral proposals than are those already
considering engaging in the electoral process. The impact of socio-demographic back-
ground on young people’s reception to these electoral measures is mixed, suggesting
that Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported by the data. There are indications of both
gender and ethnicity gaps with respect to some of the electoral items, but there is no evi-
dence that age-completed education, educational qualiﬁcations or social class structure
young people’s attitudes to these electoral reform scenarios.
Would a more coercive approach represent a viable solution? Our data suggest that
more young people would vote if compelled to do so in electoral law. However, the key
question is whether such a compulsory system of voting would truly strengthen young
people’s connection with formal democratic politics and institutions, given that they
feel such a deep aversion towards the political parties and those professional politicians
listed on ballot papers. The data reveal that previous non-voters as well as likely future
abstainers would be particularly resistant to compulsory voting, conﬁrming Hypotheses
4 and 5. Indeed, such compulsion may actually serve to reinforce a deepening resentment,
rather than to engage young people in a positive manner. Interestingly, young people’s
socio-demographic backgrounds have particular impact on this. The results from the
chi-square analyses suggest support for Hypothesis 6 that, with the exception of social
class, socio-demographic background variables signiﬁcantly structure young people’s
reaction to compulsory voting. This is the case for gender, ethnicity, level of educational
qualiﬁcations, as well as whether or not in full-time education. Furthermore, the linear
regression analyses offer partial support for this hypothesis, indicating that those who
have left full-time education are signiﬁcantly less predisposed to compulsory voting
than are those who have opted to remain in the study.
If young people are to be motivated to engage with formal politics and the electoral
process, then the political class needs to look beyond merely ‘procedural–technical’ pro-
grammes and innovations. For instance, the introduction of initiatives that encourage young
people to register to vote is positive in intention, but not always successful. Thus, the new
system for individual electoral registration (IER) that was introduced in Britain in 2014 raises
several implementation challenges. In particular, it is estimated that 800,000 people had
been lost from the electoral register by January 2016 (Mason 2016). Furthermore, evidence
suggests that those least likely to register to vote under IER include younger people, students,
those on lower incomes and society’s most vulnerable groups (Fisher and Hillman 2014).
Instead of an over-reliance on such purely administrative reforms to resolve the young
citizen–state disconnect, what is needed is a thoroughgoing review of the way in which
formal politics reaches out to young people, and prepares them for political participation.
As Stoker reports, young people are open-minded about electoral politics and do not have
a hardened disaffection; they are more likely than not to express faith in voting and the
democratic process although not with the politicians that inhabit that world (Stoker
2014). It may be that young people might opt to engage in elections if they can be
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convinced that as an age cohort they themselves and their issue priorities are treated
seriously by politicians. Reducing the voting age to 16 might assist this process by per-
suading young people that they are valued (rather than maligned) by the political class.
In doing so, it may contribute to the conversion of their democratic commitment into
democratic participation. There is no consensus on whether extending the vote to 16-
year-olds should be considered a basic right. Detractors question both the maturity of ado-
lescents aged 16 and 17 who have not yet had the opportunity to develop advanced
autonomous knowledge and understanding of politics (Chan and Clayton 2006), and
also their lack of motivation which it is argued might reduce the overall levels of electoral
participation (Electoral Commission 2004). Advocates argue that extending the vote to
young people while they are ‘members of settled communities’ – living at home and
attending school – might increase their turnout in elections (Berry and Kippin 2014, 7),
and evidence from Austria suggests that 16- and 17-year-olds are more likely to vote than
18–25-year-olds (Zeglovits and Aichholzer 2014). Furthermore, it follows that if socialised into
voting within these contexts, they are more likely to continue to do so in the future as
voting becomes habit-forming (Franklin 2004). Finally, supporters argue that enfranchising
16- and 17-year-olds would ensure that their concerns are brought to the attention of the pol-
itical class (Wagner, Johann, and Kritzinger 2012). Whether the political class chooses to act on
those concerns, however, is a different matter. Although the UK Government recently ruled
against votes for 16-year-olds at the forthcoming EU Referendum, there is a momentum devel-
oping for such a reform to British electoral law that is supported by several opposition parties.
When these younger groups were granted the right to vote at the Scottish Independence
Referendum in 2014, 80% of them cast a ballot. This suggests that young people are not
innately averse to voting on matters that are of critical consequence for them. And neither
do they ﬁnd the current voting arrangements a barrier to participation.
The conclusion that we must draw from this research is that there is no single solution to
the ongoing young citizen–state disconnect in Britain. By themselves, the introduction of
electoral administrative arrangements intended to make voting more accessible would
likely have some impact; critically, however, those youth determined to abstain at the next
election appear not to be convinced by the prospect of such new electoral methods. Simi-
larly, compulsory voting might result in a quantitative increase in the numbers of young
voters, but the evidence presented here suggests that it would not necessarily improve
the quality of broader political engagement – and may serve to reinforce young people’s
resentment of the operation of democratic politics in Britain. If young people are to be per-
suaded to vote and to participate more broadly in formal democratic politics, the onus is on
the political class to think creatively about how to make such democratic participation more
meaningful and attractive to Britain’s youth generation.
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